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Contesting Europe: The Politics of Bosnian Integration into European Structures 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores what is meant by ‘being European’ in contemporary Bosnia. Over the 
past two decades, Western politicians have justified interventions in Bosnia through 
recourse to an Orientalist binary between a rational and progressive ‘Europe’ against an 
irrational and retrogressive ‘Balkans’. Current efforts to incorporate Bosnia into 
European structures reproduces this imaginary, though in this instance replacing space 
with time, suggesting that Bosnia needs to move from a ‘Balkan’ past to a ‘European’ 
future.  In this paper I explore the political effects of such imaginaries through two levels 
of analysis. In the first, I critically examine the ongoing implications of the geopolitical 
framing of Bosnia as Europe’s ‘Other’. In the second, I explore how nationalist 
politicians have deployed European rhetoric in order to stake claims to resources and 
establish respect. I conclude by arguing that a sovereignty paradox underpins both 
‘geopolitical’ and ‘nationalist’ European rubrics in Bosnia: while idealising forms of 
solidarity based on broad social and cultural affiliations such discourses simultaneously 
seek to promote the state as the primary territorialisation of political life.  
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Introduction 
  
With the recent expansion of the European Union (EU) into Central and Eastern 
Europe, scholars have conducted sustained deliberation over who, what or where counts 
as ‘European’.  This work has isolated a familiar binary at the heart of such identity 
formation, citing that the making of the ‘European’ Self has simultaneously depended 
upon the casting out of a ‘non-European’ Other (see Fleming, 2003; Kuus, 2004; 
Kuusisto, 2004). This paper engages with one site that experienced such abandonment: 
the Balkans. It is an enduring refrain to identify the Balkans as Europe’s internal Other, a 
liminal space ‘on the doorstep of Europe’ to use Tony Blair’s phrase (see Glenny, 1999: 
xxi).  Historical surveys of European fiction and travel literature have identified the role 
played by Balkan localities as sites of deviance and criminality, juxtaposed with evidence 
of European rationality and progress.  The identification of a binary between Europe and 
the Balkans has led scholars to apply the critical tools of Said’s (1978) Orientalism to 
representations of the Balkans. In so doing, Balkanism has emerged as a distinct form of 
discursive critique, isolating the power relations masked in representations of Balkan 
identities and locations.  
Over the last two decades Bosnia has acted as a fulcrum for Balkanist 
imaginaries. In particular, the 1992-5 conflict led to certain observers and combatants 
explaining the violence as a consequence of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ or ‘primordial evil’. 
There are two key observations to be made regarding such discursive strategies. The first 
is that these enunciations do not simply circulate within an aesthetic realm, disconnected 
from political decisions and actions. They are, to draw on Judith Butler’s terminology, 
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performative in that they act as ‘citational practice[s] by which discourse produces the 
effects that it names’ (Butler, 1993: 2). Thus the labelling of the conflict by politicians in 
Western Europe as a product of ‘ancient hatreds’ shaped the terms of political and 
military intervention (see Campbell, 1998; Ó Tuathail, 2002; Jeffrey, 2007). Secondly, 
the production of Balkanist explanations of the conflict was not restricted to Western 
Europe. Such practices have been observed within the former Yugoslav republics, for 
example Močnik (2005) notes the efforts made by Slovenia’s political leaders to present 
their country’s secession as virtuous, progressive and ‘European’ in comparison with the 
immoral, retrogressive and ‘Balkan’ nature of attempts to retain the integrity of the 
Yugoslav state (see also Patterson, 2003). In the case of Bosnia the ‘othering’ of political 
opponents was not directed at agents acting outside the state, but rather at political 
opponents operating within Bosnia. For example, politicians and paramilitary leaders 
deployed Balkanist rhetoric to essentialise Bosnian identities and cast enemy groups as 
‘primitive’ in comparison with the enlightened and ‘European’ nature of their own 
dispositions. Such discourses attached specific character traits to the binary between 
‘Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’, varying from religious affiliation (Christian versus Muslim); 
alphabet (Latin versus Cyrillic) or cultural outlook (multicultural versus mono-ethnic).  
The expansion of the EU into the Balkans has led scholars to reconsider the 
production of Balkanist binaries and their political effects. In Bosnia, the simultaneous 
embrace of Europe by both international agencies and local nationalist political parties 
has re-emphasised the role played by ‘being European’ in the construction of the Self. 
The process of consciously staking out European credentials has been explored in the 
case of Croatia by Slavenka Drakulić (1996), where she highlights the trend for 
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commercial buildings previously named ‘Balkan’ to be re-branded in the mid-1990s as 
‘Europa’. ‘The new name,’ she notes ‘is loaded with a complexity of positive values’ 
(Drakulić, 1996: 11). While a similar reliance on the virtue of European associations can 
be observed in contemporary Bosnia, the implications of divergent political groups using 
European rhetoric requires analysis. Therefore, as claims to Bosnia’s Balkan past 
legitimised particular styles of international intervention during the conflict, articulations 
of Bosnia’s European future are equally performative. And just as such imaginaries were 
not restricted to external actors outside the Bosnian state, so too has ‘being European’ 
become a universal aspiration amongst Bosnian political parties. The question, then, is 
not whether Europe is perceived in a positive sense in contemporary Bosnian political 
discourses, but rather what is conceived as ‘European’ in such rubrics.  
In this paper I will seek to address this question through an examination of the 
political effects of European discourses in contemporary Bosnia. Using case-study 
material from ‘geopolitical’ and ‘nationalist’ discourses, I will look to explore the forms 
of solidarity and territorialisation on which contemporary Europeanization depends. In 
doing so I will argue that a sovereignty paradox underpins both ‘geopolitical’ and 
‘nationalist’ European rubrics in Bosnia: while idealising forms of solidarity based on 
broad social and cultural affiliations such discourses simultaneously seek to promote the 
state as the primary territorialisation of political life. Though notionally cosmopolitan in 
its invocation of an ethical and political community operating beyond the particularities 
of an individual state, the evidence from Bosnia suggests that European ideals look to 
solidify forms of citizenship and territory firmly rooted in the state.  
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This argument draws on qualitative ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the 
Bosnian towns of Brčko and Sarajevo between July 2002 and August 2003, with follow-
up visits in 2004 and 2007. This research focused on the role of civil society actors in 
post-conflict Bosnia, and their relationship with political parties and international 
organisations. Using qualitative methodologies of participant observation and semi-
structured interviews I explored the ambiguous position of civil society organisations 
within networks of patronage in post-Dayton Bosnia. In the process representatives of 
international organisations and Bosnian political parties firmly rooted Bosnian politics in 
the wider historical drama of European enlargement. Such discussions provide qualitative 
evidence of the political imaginations underpinning European discourses in contemporary 
Bosnia. In the following argument this interview data is corroborated and compared to 
two archives of textual material: documentation connected to political parties and reports 
produced by the international organisations supervising and observing Bosnia. It is not 
my intention to use this data to draw expansive conclusions regarding the Bosnian state, 
but rather collate these different forms of evidence in order to explore a number of 
situated European vocabularies in Bosnia.   
The argument in this paper is made over three sections. The first surveys the 
recent history of Balkanist interpretations of Bosnia’s past. This theoretical work stakes 
out two particular points for critique within Balkanist interpretations of Bosnian history: 
first, the notion of a coherent, democratic Western European polity that is required to 
intervene and ‘correct’ social failings in Bosnia; and second, that this binary can be 
spatially delineated between West and East. Building on this material, the second section 
traces how international agents in Bosnia have relied on Balkanist binaries to shape 
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international interventions both during the conflict and in the post-conflict period. In 
particular, the notion of ‘transition’, suggesting that Bosnia must travel from its Balkan 
past to a European future, has become normalised within international discourses. But 
through analysis of the political effects of such enunciations, I argue that European 
aspirations mask the preoccupation of intervening agencies with strengthening the power 
of the Bosnian state. In the third section I contrast such international invocations of 
Europe with the narratives of local Bosnian political party activists and civil society 
organisations. Recalling Bakić-Hayden’s (1995) notion of nested orientalisms, this 
material highlights the multiple scales and locales of Balkanist imaginaries. In particular I 
illustrate how Serb politicians have staked claim to their European credentials while 
simultaneously stressing the centrality of cultural difference in structuring social life. 
Again, I focus on the political effects of discursive strategies. While challenging the 
notions of ‘transition’ present within the discourses of international agencies operating in 
Bosnia, discourses of Serbian Europeanism legitimise the continued Serb state project in 
Bosnia: the Republika Srpska.  
 
Balkanism  
 
The land was wild, the people impossible. What could be expected of women and 
children, creatures whom God had not endowed with reason, in a country where 
even the men were violent and uncouth? Nothing these people did or said had any 
significance, nor could it affect the affairs of serious, cultivated men (Andrić, 
2000: 24). 
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 In The Days of the Consuls, originally published in 1941, Nobel Laureate Ivo 
Andrić describes the reaction of a young French consul on arrival to the Bosnian town of 
Travnik at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century. The author uses irony to expose the 
pejorative preconceptions of the Western European diplomat; since Andrić originates 
from Travnik, this is a self-description through the eyes of an agent of colonial rule. This 
‘Othering of the Self’ animates a key theme of Andrić’s writings, namely the quotidian 
conflicts and traumas caused by the foreign occupation and colonisation of Bosnian 
territory (see Longinović, 1995). Thus Andrić highlights a central aspect of postcolonial 
critique, that colonial power is not derived solely through practices of government, but is 
formulated, legitimised and reproduced through representations and discourses of the 
Other. 
In drawing attention to the importance of imaginary geographies within projects 
of colonial rule in the Balkans Andrić’s work serves as a relevant starting point for an 
exploration of the role of Balkanism within the enactment of foreign and domestic policy 
in Bosnia. For Maria Todorova (1997) critiques of Balkanism draw attention to the 
multiple mechanisms and registers through which the Balkans have served as a 
‘repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory 
image of the ‘European’ and the ‘West’ has been constructed’ (Todorova, 1997: 188). 
Within this discourse ‘Europe’ stands for modernist ideals of rationality, morality and 
consensual politics while the ‘Balkans’ are cast as a place of barbarism, irrationality and 
‘ancient hatreds’.  In critiquing this binary, a series of studies have explored the 
representation of the Balkans within philosophic geographies of Western European travel 
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writers, novelists, scholars and politicians. Vesna Goldsworthy’s Inventing Ruritania 
(1998) serves as a key example of this literature, where she suggests that authors such as 
Bram Stoker, Anthony Hope and George Bernard Shaw locate their narratives in the 
Balkans as a means of ‘subverting a variety of taboos and satisfying hidden desires’ (p. 
126). Goldsworthy is clear that these representations, which she argues amount to 
‘imaginative colonialism’,  have a performative force: ‘a cultural great power seizes and 
exploits the resources of an area, while imposing new frontiers on its mind map and 
creating ideas which, reflected back, have the ability to reshape reality’ (p. 3). 
As alluded to earlier, this exploration of the representative mechanisms through 
which Self and Other are mapped onto Europe and the Balkans draws on Edward Said’s 
Orientalism (1978). But as a number of scholars have argued, there are specificities to the 
intellectual and imperial histories of the Balkans that preclude unproblematic 
transpositions of Said’s reflections on the portrayal of the Orient (Bakić-Hayden, 1995; 
Fleming 2003; Todorova, 1998). As Fleming (2003) suggests, both Balkanism and 
Orientalism focus their critique on a ‘system of representation’ but ‘this system is based 
on different referents -- historical, geographical, and conceptual’ (p. 13). Specifically, 
despite Ottoman rule, the Balkan countries were not colonized in the same fashion as the 
Orient. It is argued the absence of Western European colonial rule cannot be adequately 
replaced by an ‘imaginary colonialism’ of the style articulated by Goldsworthy above 
(ibid.). Thus despite the clear parallels between Balkanism and Orientalism in the field of 
knowledge production, the specific history of the Balkans renders the distinction between 
a colonial West and a colonised East more difficult to delineate. Indeed, one of the 
strengths of Balkanist critique is its encapsulation of the hybridity and dynamism of 
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relations of domination, in a situation where Balkan people perceive each other as ‘both 
colonial rulers and colonial subjects’ (Bjelić, 2005: 6). Recent studies of political 
discourses within the Former Yugoslavia have drawn attention to this appropriation of 
Balkanist tropes by local politicians in order to demonstrate ‘Western’ credentials while 
orientalising political opponents as betraying ‘Eastern’ cultural or social practices (see 
Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Bjelić and Savić, 2005). It has thus been argued that Balkanism 
‘meanders between Orientalism and Occidentalism, once as a representational 
mechanism, again as a subjectivational process’ (Bjelić, 2005: 5). 
Building on this distinction between the representational and the subjectivational, 
Močnik (2005) isolates two types of relations of domination encompassed within the 
ideology of Balkanism: ‘the relations of geo-political and economic hegemony, and the 
relations of internal domination within the societies geopolitically stigmatized as 
“Balkan”’ (p. 79).  This is an important distinction that highlights the two spheres in 
which the binary between ‘Europe’ and ‘non-Europe’ is analysed in this paper. In the first 
instance, I explore the geopolitical making of Bosnia as a site of intervention, cast out as 
a ‘non-European’ Other. It is not my intention to provide a full exegesis of the cultural 
foundations of what can be termed ‘Balkanist geopolitics’, but rather to focus on its 
effects. This discussion thus explores the mechanisms that have been put in place to bring 
Bosnia ‘into Europe’. In the second instance I build on what Močnik terms ‘internal 
domination’, the means through which Balkanism is reasserted within Bosnia in order to 
stake claims to resources and establish respect. The strategies through which European 
credentials are articulated in Bosnia serves to both mirror Balkanist geopolitics (the 
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casting out of a Balkan other as socially and culturally inferior) while also deploying a 
radically contrasting image of European belonging.  
 
Balkanist Geopolitics 
 
Balkanist accounts of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia between 1991-1999 
presented an essentialised view of the Balkans, where attributes were temporally fixed 
and constituted through a pre-existing tendency towards inter-ethnic antagonism and 
conflict.  Silber and Little (1995) lament how foreign diplomats ‘behaved as though the 
war had no underlying structural causes at all [...]. They behaved as though all they had to 
do was to persuade the belligerents of the folly of war’ (Silber and Little, 1995: 159). In 
place of criticising nationalistic political rhetoric in Bosnia, political leaders and 
strategists in Western Europe turned to trusted Balkanised accounts to explain the conflict 
(see Major, 1999, Owen, 1998). Crucially, such interpretations of the conflict led to an 
assumption that the only means of resolution of the violence was the partition of territory 
down ethno-national lines. Drawing on Jacques Derrida (1994), David Campbell (1998) 
describes this alignment between territory and identity as ‘ontopological’, as national 
identities are fused with the particular territories (Derrida, 1994 in Campbell, 1998: 80). 
Reflecting this logic, the 1995 Dayton Agreement finally ended the violence through the 
division of the Bosnian territory into two sub-state ‘entities’ divided by the Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line: the Muslim-Croat Federation1 and the Republika Srpska (RS), plus a 
small ‘special district’ in the north-east municipality of Brčko. In doing so, the very 
measures used to mediate the worst excesses of nationalistic politics created the 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Federation’. 
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conditions for its continued survival in post-conflict Bosnia. The central state institutions 
were left with little power and a cumbersome tripartite presidential system consisting of 
eight-month rotating tenures. Consequently, many of the central Bosnian government 
powers were devolved to the two entities and Brčko District, loosely federated as they 
were within the Bosnian state.   
The sub-division of Bosnia into the two entities and a ‘special district’ has served 
to both limit the power of state level institutions and entrench support for nationalist 
political parties in the ten years since the Dayton Agreement. The elections in late 1996, 
held to demonstrate to American and Western European electorates that progress was 
being made in Bosnia, only served to entrench the power of nationalist political parties in 
the immediate post-war period (Donais, 2000; International Crisis Group, 1996). Despite 
fluctuating backing for the more moderate and multi-ethnic Socijaldemokratska Partija 
(SDP), support for the three main nationalist political parties (the Serb Srpska 
Demokratska Stranka or SDS, the Stranka Demokratska Akcije or SDA and the Croat 
Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica or HDZ) remains relatively strong across the country; 
in the 2004 election these parties gained 71 percent of the popular vote (OSCE, 2004). 
The fractured nature of the Bosnian state has been masked through intense international 
supervision and intervention. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), the 
international body established to implement the civilian aspects of the Dayton 
Agreement, has provided supervision of political processes, with other international 
agencies focusing on security (NATO, EU-For), democratization and elections (OSCE), 
police reform (UN and EU) and financial structures (World Bank, IMF).  
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Somewhat counter intuitively, the powers of the OHR have increased since the 
Dayton Agreement, a response to intransigent local political parties and growing 
international impatience at the slow rate of Bosnian state reform. In the initial post-
conflict period the OHR felt that conditionalities and indirect influence could shape the 
reform of the Bosnian state. But in light of the failure of this strategy to enact reform or 
establish the basic rule of law the High Representative was granted, at the Bonn Peace 
Implementation Conference in 1997, wide ranging executive and legislative powers to 
intervene in Bosnian political processes.  These ‘Bonn powers’ have been criticised by 
certain scholars as constituting imperial ‘rule by decree’, where policies enacted in the 
name of ‘Bosnian democratization’ have been passed behind the closed doors of OHR 
meeting rooms without consultation of the Bosnian public (see Chandler, 2000). This 
aspect of Bonn Powers has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, for example by 
the sacking of the President of the Serbian Radical Party Vojislav Šešelj in March 1998 
by High Representative Wolfgang Petritch, or High Representative Lord Paddy 
Ashdown’s decision in March 2005 to sack the Croatian Bosnian presidential candidate 
Dragan Cović for charges of serious corruption.  These powers have also been used to 
intervene in more symbolic matters of Bosnian politics, such as the decision in October 
2005 to block the renaming of Sarajevo airport after the wartime leader of the Bosnian 
Muslim (or Bosniak) orientated SDA, Alija Izetbegović (see OHR, 2005a).   
Just as the conflict in Bosnia was used to justify Balkanist readings of the region’s 
history (see above), so the use of Bonn Powers has only served to validate nationalist 
political rhetoric branding the West as imperial invaders, particularly in light of the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 or the death of Slobodan Milosevic in the custody 
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of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in March 2006. 
The continued strength of nationalist political parties means limited progress has been 
made in Bosnia in establishing a meaningful and universally accepted Bosnian 
citizenship. Instead, solidarities still appear to be shaped by ethno-national identity. 
Perhaps the most significant element of the denial of the past in contemporary Bosnia is 
the lack of attention by the international community to issues of reconciliation between 
ethno-national groups, leading to the proliferation of memorials commemorating 
mythologised nationalist events and figures (Jeffrey, 2006).  
 The notion that Bosnia must ‘find its feet’, break its ‘culture of dependency’, or 
even ‘let go of nurse’, is prevalent across Western commentary on the post-conflict 
political landscape of Bosnia (see Conces, 2001; Intermedia, 2005; International Crisis 
Group, 2003). In the decade following the Dayton Agreement, international observers 
have been keen to point to the growing independence of Bosnia, citing that the country is 
no longer ‘post-conflict’ but is now confronting similar challenges to other post-socialist 
states2. These comments would suggest that the challenges of fitting the remnants of 
Bosnian industrial production into international circuits of capital and labour have come 
to take precedence over issues of keeping belligerent parties at peace. Certainly, it was 
the preoccupation of local government officials surveyed during the research in Brčko to 
conform to budgetary norms set out by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID)-funded ‘District Management Team’3. But more recently, this 
neoliberal transformation has been encapsulated in stark geographical terms: that Bosnia 
                                                 
2
 This shift was given the shorthand ‘from emergency to transition’ by a United Nations Development 
Programme official in Sarajevo, 29/05/03. 
3
 Interview with Brčko District Mayor, Brčko 08/05/03. 
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must move ‘from Dayton to Brussels’ (see Ashdown, 2005a; Judah, 2000; Ó Tuathail, 
2005).   
This Balkanist concept of ‘transition’ (from a Balkan past to a European future) 
was neatly captured the then High Representative, Lord Paddy Ashdown, in a speech in 
late 2005: 
 
[...] EU membership will lock this country firmly into the democratic mainstream. 
It means access to EU development funds that can help turn the economy around. 
It means more foreign investment, creating more jobs. It means European 
standard justice. It means that – in the run up to membership – Bosnian politicians 
will have to show common sense and legislate the huge number of laws that are 
required to bring Bosnia into line with European standards. Each of those laws 
will help initiate improvements in living standards (Ashdown, 2005b). 
  
In setting EU membership in these terms, Ashdown makes a connection between 
accession and the establishment of democratic norms and values. The close articulation 
between Europeanization and democratization is understandable given that within EU 
enlargement documentation Europe is presented as “an area of freedom, security and 
justice” (Commission of the European Communities, 2004).  Where the Bosnian state has 
failed to act as a locus of citizenship or democratization, Ashdown’s invocations of 
supra-national sovereignty looks beyond the nation-state to the protective and 
democratizing values of EU. This rhetoric conjures an image of democratic 
cosmopolitanism, where membership of the EU establishes an accountable structure of 
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governance ‘above’ the scale of the state (see Held and Archibugi, 1995).  In contrast to 
OHR-led practices of Bosnian state building, where a large percentage of the population 
(predominantly Serb and Croat constituencies) did not consent to the project, there 
appears to be universal support from Bosnian political parties for integration into Europe 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2003; Hayden, 2002).  
But this virtuous narrative of Europeanization, where increasing integration to 
European structures affords democratic opportunities for the Bosnian citizen, underplays 
the conflicts and contingencies that have shaped the implementation of this policy in 
Bosnia. With particular reference to the paper’s core argument relating to the politics of 
Balkanist imaginaries, in what follows I will draw out two points that serve to 
problematise the invocation of a ‘transition’ from an imagined Balkan past to a European 
future. First, the process of ‘Europeanization’ has not significantly reconfigured the 
power relations of international intervention: the OHR’s repeated references to ‘European 
values’ masks the differential power positions of the actors involved in this political 
negotiation, while the abstract claims to democratization pay little attention to meaningful 
participation at the local level. Second, despite rhetoric of democratization and 
cosmopolitan political values, the central political effect of closer integration with Europe 
has been the strengthening of the Bosnian state. These two points are explored below 
through an examination of conditionalities relating to Bosnian entrance to the Council of 
Europe and the opening of Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) talks. 
Until the opening of SAA talks in November 2005 the EU had no formal 
contractual relationship with Bosnia, their contact has thus been “short, but intense” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 5). But despite the absence of formal 
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obligations, the EU and Bosnia have been in “structured dialogue” since the Dayton 
Agreement (see Commission of the European Communities, 2005). In recent years this 
dialogue has stimulated a number of high profile contacts between the EU and Bosnia. 
For example, since March 2002 the High Representative (then Lord Paddy Ashdown) has 
simultaneously held the post of EU Special Representative, to form the central point of 
contact between the EU and Bosnia. The EU have, as stated in the introduction, also 
taken over other defence and security competences over the last three years, most notably 
with the EU police mission and the EU security force EU-For (see Juncos, 2005).   
But to reduce the role of Europe to these tangible aspects would be to overlook 
the patterns of influence and authority European institutions have exercised in Bosnia 
since the Dayton Agreement.  Part of this influence has been mobilised through the 
lengthy procedures to join the Council of Europe (CoE), an organisation that, while not 
directly affiliated to the EU, seeks to monitor and harmonise social, governmental and 
legal structures across its 46 member states (see Council of Europe, 2006). In 2001 the 
CoE gave Bosnia a series of political, social and economic criteria as conditions for 
gaining membership of the group.  The level of detail within this document indicates how 
the conditionality of CoE membership was closely embroiled with the objectives of the 
international supervision of Bosnia. In particular, the first criterion set out by the CoE is 
‘[t]o co-operate fully and effectively in the implementation of the  Dayton Peace 
Agreements, which notably require the settlement of internal and international disputes 
by peaceful means’ (Council of Europe, 2001).  While further criteria refer to the 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), other aspects articulate closely with the practices of the 
OHR. For example, criterion IV(c) states that the Bosnian government must “adopt, 
within six months after its accession, if it has not yet been done, the laws which have 
been temporarily imposed by the High Representative” (Council of Europe, 2001). This 
presents the Bosnian interlocutors with an open-ended conditionality, where membership 
of the CoE is dependent upon the fulfillment of laws that are yet to be imposed by the 
OHR. This situation became tautological when the then High Representative Wolfgang 
Petritsch placed pressure on the Bosnian House of Representatives in 2001 to adopt a 
new election law, since they were failing in their fulfillment of CoE conditions (see OHR, 
2001).  
The OHR and CoE conditionalities are thus seemingly entangled, their combined 
instruments of authority urging the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, while 
reproducing international authority. Following the adoption of a new election law in 
August 2001, Bosnia was successful in its accession to the Council of Europe in April 
2002, leading the then High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch to celebrate that Bosnia 
had found a ‘European perspective’: 
 
[n]one of the mainstream parties now dispute the central political tenet that 
integration in Europe is the overarching aspiration of politics, economy and 
society in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR, 2002). 
  
 The penetration of the ‘European aspiration’ to the heart of political, economic 
and social life in Bosnia was acutely felt through the subsequent conditionalities attached 
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to opening negotiations on the SAA. Like the CoE criteria, a ‘road map’ was produced 
for Bosnian accession to the EU, identifying eighteen steps necessary for the opening of 
negotiations on SAA. The EU deemed these initial steps “substantially completed” in 
2002, leading to a broader feasibility study for opening SAA talks. This study grouped 
the remaining objectives of SAA criteria under three headings: political criteria 
(democracy, the rule of law, compliance with the ICTY and human rights), economic 
criteria (fiscal sustainability, privatisation and financial sector review) and criteria 
relating to the ability to assume the obligations of the SAA (covering issues of the 
implementation of reform, foreign policy and regional co-operation) (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003). The primacy of compliance with the ICTY within this 
document has led Ó Tuathail (2005) to remark that the ‘the road to the EU runs through 
the Hague’ (p. 57).  
The political and social priorities contained in the SAA feasibility study emerged 
from Bosnia’s membership of the Stability Pact, an EU initiative established as a conflict-
prevention measure ‘aimed at strengthening the efforts of the countries of South East 
Europe in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity’ 
(Stability Pact, 2006). The resulting criteria for SAA differ from the CoE in that they 
purposefully look beyond Dayton, acknowledging its flaws as a cumbersome and 
inefficient architecture of governance. In particular, the SAA criteria seek to dilute the 
primacy of ethnic identity with the territorialisation of Bosnia through the strengthening 
of the state-level Council of Ministers, removing parallel functions at municipal, canton 
and entity levels and strengthening a professionalised civil service (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003).  In doing so, SAA criteria have served a useful function 
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for the OHR as a means of revising the Dayton constitution under the auspices of 
European integration.   
While the OHR may enroll the powerful imagery and vocabulary of a decisive 
break from international supervision through Europeanization, the conditionality of CoE 
and SAA reforms seem to suggest significant continuities in the exercise of international 
authority in Bosnia. Thus I would suggest that three key points can made in relation to 
emergent European rubrics in contemporary Bosnia. First, the deployment of Balkanistic 
rhetoric by international agencies (such as the OHR) continued since the conflict, 
principally through the assertion that Bosnia is a state ‘in transition’ from a past of 
ancient hatreds to a new European future. Second, though the OHR have connected 
Europeanization and democratization, the discussion demonstrates that the 
conditionalities inherent in the process of Europeanization, both through the CoE and the 
EU, are intricately bound into the priorities and practices of the existing international 
agencies in Bosnia. When I met an assistant to the High Representative in Sarajevo in 
2003, he spoke at length of the importance of European criteria in instigating state reform 
and integration, acting as a ‘pull’ factor, against the ‘push’ of the OHR4.  This rhetoric 
echoes the oft-stated division between ‘hard’ Bonn Powers with the ‘soft’ conditionalities 
associated with membership of European frameworks.  In practice the evidence presented 
in this discussion suggests that the distinction between these variants of international 
influence cannot be so cleanly delineated.  Third, though bound in rubrics of 
cosmopolitan affiliation to a European citizenry, the conditionalities of SAA and CoE 
accession have been firmly rooted in the cultivation of strengthened state sovereignty and 
citizenship.  The spatialities and chronologies of such geopolitical Balkanism can be 
                                                 
4
 Interview with assistant to the High Representative, Sarajevo 28/05/03.  
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usefully compared with the emerging European rubrics within Bosnia, where 
designations of ‘European’ and ‘Balkan’ are flexibly applied between opposing political 
groups. It is within such Balkanist scripts that radically oppositional concepts of Europe 
emerged. But despite diverging from the earlier narratives of Balkanist geopolitics, these 
concepts of ‘Europeanization’ retain an attachment to state sovereignty as the primary 
unit of political life. 
 
Nested Balkanism 
 
Between 1992-1995 Serb paramilitary groups supported by the Jugoslovenska 
Narodna Armija (Yugoslav Peoples’ Army or JNA) carved the Republika Srpska as an 
exclusively Serb territory from the Bosnian state. The political underpinnings of such 
military and paramilitary actions emerged from the ultra-nationalist rhetoric of Radovan 
Karañžić, founder of the SDS, who outlined the exclusive spatiality of the RS through the 
blunt refrain that “our territories are ours, we can go hungry but we shall remain on 
them” (Karañžić, 1991). Such a geographical imagination does not simply outline a set of 
spatial objectives, but simultaneously emphasises the absolute nature of cultural 
difference within the political philosophy of the SDS. Echoing the integralist rhetoric of 
the French and British nationalist politicians studied in the work of Douglas Holmes 
(2000), it was ‘heterogeneity’ and ‘rootlessness’ that was perceived to pose a threat to 
Serb national interest in Bosnia.  An SDS representative in Brčko alluded to this when he 
stated the key failing of (the multi-ethnic) Brčko District was its heterogeneity, offering 
the explanation that “we don’t like being mixed, when there is mixing there are 
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problems”5. This notion of ‘mixing’ relies on stable, knowable and essentially different 
ethnic groups comprising the key social and political cleavage in Bosnia.  
The creation of the RS, then, was a process of ‘un-mixing’ the Bosnian population 
and creating an ethno-nationally homogenous territory.  The violence that accompanied 
this process was both physical and symbolic, from the expulsion of the non-Serb 
population through to the destruction of references to other ethno-national groups within 
the built environment. Since Brčko occupied a key strategic location connecting the two 
halves of the RS the town constituted a particular focus for Serb paramilitary action (see 
Kadrić, 1995).  Such ‘ethnic cleansing’ continued in the post-conflict period in both the 
RS and parts of the Federation through policies passed at the entity level designed to 
dissuade returns and solidify the gains of the war (see Coward, 2002; Dahlman and Ó 
Tuathail, 2005). From 1996, towns that had previously held a Bosniak majority within the 
RS, such as Brčko, underwent a rapid Serbianisation, involving the renaming of streets, 
the construction of Serb orientated memorials and the building of Serb Orthodox 
churches, often on the site of vacated Bosniak homes (International Crisis Group, 1998; 
Jeffrey, 2006). The intention was to create an ethnically homogenous state-like territory, 
whilst simultaneously removing the possibility of heterogeneous identities and 
affiliations.  
 The violence of the formation of the RS highlights the potential paradox of the 
current European preoccupations of Serb political parties. Over the last decade the 
manifestos of the main political parties in Bosnia have converged on the issue of Europe, 
each stating the ‘overriding value of European integration’ (UNDP, 2002: 4). In the case 
of Brčko, the political parties contesting the 2002 presidential election embedded their 
                                                 
5
 Interview with SDS representative, Brčko 14/04/03. 
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campaign materials in the language and symbolism of the European Union.  For example 
a billboard advertisement for the PDP, a moderate Serb nationalist political party, 
declared their party’s European credentials by exclaiming ‘Да, Порτале Европска а 
орτале Српска’ (‘Yes, you can be European and you can be Serbian’) (see Figure 1). The 
words are adorned with juxtaposed European and Serbian flags, and a picture depicting a 
woman standing over a child doing written work, under the phrase ‘Да, Учимо’ (Yes, We 
Study’). Animating what Ó Tuathail refers to as the RS’s ‘existential crisis’ (2005: 59), 
the wording of this advertisement appears to pose a direct challenge to the image of 
Serbian nationalism as parochial, traditional or depending on founding myths, and instead 
offering an alternative vision of a cosmopolitan Serbianism accommodated within the 
EU.  It could be argued that rather than celebrating an established national space, this 
poster offers an anti-ontopological vision, one where solidarity does not rely on a 
particular fixed identity but rather a shared modernity.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 PDP Election Poster, Brčko 2002 (Source: Author’s Collection) 
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 But an interpretation of the poster, and the political rubrics from which it 
emerges, as a performance of a ‘new’ Serbian political imagination ignores the extent to 
which such pronouncements of Europeanism are strategically relational. This point was 
clear in discussions with Serb political party members and representatives of Serbian civil 
society organisations in Brčko, where Serbian Europeanism was justified in relation to 
other non-European groups. ‘You need to be realistic,’ said the founder of a Serbian 
Orthodox youth organisation ‘Serbs are part of Europe, we have a Christian past’6. The 
idea of ‘being realistic’ was often used a means through which nationalist viewpoints 
could be raised in the interview setting, presenting the opinion as common sense in 
comparison to the ‘unnatural’ nature of multi-ethic Bosnia. In this register of cultural 
difference Serbian claims to European membership stem from its religious heritage, a 
trait that sets them apart from the Bosniak community.  
Thus a new terrain of Balkanism is opened where a Bosnian Serb claim to 
Europeanism is structured around the identification of a non-European other. Following 
Bakić-Hayden (1995), this can be described as ‘nested Balkanism’ since ‘the designation 
of “other” has been appropriated and manipulated by those who have themselves been 
designated as such in orientalist discourse’ (p. 922).   This Balkanist ideology reflects 
arguments made in relation to the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, where certain Serbian 
commentators and politicians have portrayed the battle as a defence of Europe (the 
Serbian Kingdom) against invading Ottoman troops (see Kalajić, 1995). Echoing strands 
of contemporary resistance to Turkish membership to the EU, this vision promotes 
European unity as a Christian affiliation rather than based on the spread of democratic 
principles of freedom and security. This directly challenges the rhetoric of CoE and SAA 
                                                 
6
 Interview with the founder of the St. Sava’s Youth Association, Brčko 3/12/02. 
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criteria, since these political requirements are structured around Bosnian state 
membership as a multi-ethnic polity, not on the membership of the Serb minority as part 
of a normative vision of Christian European identity.   
 While promoting the notion of a set of enduring cultural differences fragmenting 
Bosnian society, such nested Balkanism simultaneously serves to disrupt the chronology 
of the geopolitical imaginaries of intervening agencies in Bosnia. Rather than seeing 
European membership as a claim that is accredited through the recognition of certain 
criteria by international actors, the SDS representative criticised the process of European 
integration and simply stated that ‘Serbs have a right to be part of Europe’7. Probed 
further, the representative of the SDS based this assertion of entitlement on the high 
culture of Serbian society reflecting its inherently civilized nature. Indeed, the central 
preoccupation of the three Serbian youth organizations in Brčko was the preservation of 
cultural heritage and ‘developing spiritual identity’ 8, through ‘trips to monasteries’9, 
‘youth discussion groups’10 and a range of sporting activities.  The conception of an 
enduring threat to Serbian cultural heritage articulated in these research encounters 
echoes a strand of contemporary Serbian victimhood, where notions of Serbian identity 
are mobilised as a means of explaining the marginalised position of Serbs within the 
European Union. In such accounts, Serbs are again the sole defenders of Europe, as they 
were in 1389, though this time from the secular and commercialized European values 
invading from the West (Čolović, 2002). These interpretations of European enlargement 
have redeployed Balkanist language to suggest that “the shadow of the collapse [of 
                                                 
7
 Interview with SDS representative, Brčko 14/04/03. 
8
 Survey of the Serb Youth Association, Brčko 21/10/02. 
9
 Survey of the Grčica Youth Association, Brčko 21/10/02. 
10
 Interview with representative of the Serb Sister’s Association, Brčko 23/10/02. 
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Europe] began to spread the moment people in west European countries lost their sense 
of real values, that is, when money, material concerns and economic interest took the 
place of philosophy, religion, history and politics” (Čolović, 2002: 39). This concept of a 
‘collapse’ of European cultural values seems to reflect the assertions of Milan Kundera’s 
Tragedy of Central Europe (1984) where he explores the disjunction between perceptions 
of ‘Europeaness’ between Central and Western Europe. Kundera outlines the irony of the 
cherishing of a ‘European’ cultural identity in then Communist Central Europe at a time 
when ‘Europe’ was no longer perceived as a cultural value in Western Europe. Through 
such tropes RS politicians can present intransigence at the requirements of the CoE or 
SAA as the ‘authentic’ defence of European values against the neoliberal interventions 
made in the name of the European Union (Kalinić, 2004), a stance that has found fertile 
ground in some strands of the academic left (see, for example, Johnstone, 2002). 
Concurring with the study of Holmes (2000), this political project appears to foreground 
the essential cultural difference of Serbs as a means of mediating the alienation of 
neoliberal reform.  Within this optic, ‘being European’ is stripped of its cosmopolitan 
affiliations, and replaced with a parochial connection to the Serbian nation. 
Mirroring the Balkanist geopolitics of the Bosnian war, this interpretation of 
Serbian Europeaness creates an idealized Serb (cultured and sacred) against a vilified 
European (vulgar and profane). But more than a judgement of character traits, this 
Balkanist binary has political effects. In shifting the debate to questions of essential 
identities, this register of Europeanization ignores the tangible political necessities of 
Bosnian accession, such as the reform of the Bosnian state. Indeed, this concept of 
Europeanism is structured around a competing state project, the defence of the 
27 
sovereignty of the RS. This tension between the demands of European integration and the 
desire to retain the sovereignty of the RS has been demonstrated in the recent protracted 
negotiations over Bosnian police reform (see DTT-NET.COM, 2006; OHR, 2005b). In 
the case of Brčko, a number of NGOs felt that operating projects between the two entities 
(the Federation and the RS) was difficult due to the lack of cooperation from RS 
authorities. This was evidenced by one youth NGO coordinator, who was responsible for 
five NGO projects across Bosnia operating on both sides of the Inter-Entity Boundary 
Line, who expressed frustration at the obstructive practices of RS officials towards 
reform of the Bosnian state: 
 
[...] there is not a willingness in RS to have projects on their territory that are 
governed by the state level, because it is seen as a weakening of the powers of RS. 
They [RS officials] have said to me ‘we are never going to accept the state system 
you know, the state level has been devised to allow the ethos of the Federation to 
have its power, and it will weaken the RS to support anything that gives the state 
level credibility, we would undermine the power of the RS. So we have to hold 
very tight to RS power and not give anything’ (Interview with youth NGO 
coordinator, Brčko 07/05/03). 
 
 Thus being European, within the optic of Serbian political parties, involves a 
defence of the RS against the erosion by international agencies seeking to strengthen the 
Bosnian state. Blurring sovereignty and cultural identity, this motivation to retain the 
distinction of Serbian cultural heritage allows RS politicians to simultaneously announce 
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European aspirations while defending the considerable powers of the RS.  The evidence 
from Brčko would suggest caution in interpreting the circulation of European rhetoric 
within Serbian political parties as a shift to a more cosmopolitan ethos based on the 
spread of shared values. Rather, this discussion has challenged this image through a 
consideration of radical cultural Europeanism that does not promote a trans-national 
belonging, but rather essentialises particular cultural traits as representing ‘Europeaness’. 
In this way, political parties, such as the PDP, create a discursive space to promote 
Europeanism, while simultaneously blocking constitutional and institutional reform that 
would assist Bosnian accession to the EU.  
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the darkest moments of the conflict in Brčko was the destruction of the 
large 19th century Hotel Posavina in the centre of town in April 1992. The hotel’s popular 
coffee lounge and cinema were destroyed, leaving a charred shell overlooking the town’s 
central square. The hotel was not targeted for its military threat, it was not used as a 
barracks and it held no strategic value within the geography of the conflict in Brčko. 
Rather the threat posed by the hotel was a cultural one, it symbolised the possibility of 
inter-ethnic exchange and heterogeneity.  The international response to the Bosnian 
conflict was to subscribe to the central logic of such attacks, explaining the violence as a 
consequence of intractable cultural differences across the Bosnian state. The solution to 
the conflict, the creation of exclusive ethno-national territories in Bosnia, served to 
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sustain this vision and created the conditions within which nationalist political parties 
could continue to thrive.  
This paper has explored how such material and cartographic violence has been 
inserted into discourses of Europeanization by international agencies and nationalist 
political parties in the post-conflict period. This discussion has used the analytical tools 
developed by critics of Balkanism to explore how assertions of ‘Europeaness’ have relied 
on a simultaneous casting out of a non-European ‘Other’. The paper identified these 
practices in two arenas. The first, within a geopolitical register, explored the current 
attempts by international agencies to position Bosnia as a state ‘in transition’ to European 
norms, a practice that serves to entrench a Balkanised imaginary of a state confined by its 
past and in need of expert assistance. But by constructing a purportedly ‘undemocratic’ 
Bosnia, international agencies serve to recover an image of Western Europe as a symbol 
of democratic virtue. This dual identity formation accords with Žižek’s (1990) assertion 
that it is in Eastern Europe that the West constructs its ‘Ego-ideal’, banishing the ‘decay 
and crisis’ of its own democratic practices and  looking to the East ‘for the authentic 
experience of “democratic invention”’ (p. 50). But the analysis of interview and textual 
material drew into question the entanglement of ‘Europeanization’ and 
‘Democratization’. Rather, the conditionality related to CoE and SAA negotiations 
suggested continuity in the mechanisms of international intervention and the reliance on 
building state sovereignty.  In the second arena, the paper explored how processes of 
‘Europeanization’ have seen the adoption and redeployment of Balkanist imaginaries by 
nationalist political parties.  This material brought to the fore the ‘nested Balkanism’ of a 
30 
radical Serbian Europeanism, structured around essential cultural differences and founded 
on the rejection of Bosniak claims to a European heritage.  
 The mirrored discourses of Self and Other present in these two arenas of enquiry 
demonstrate the enduring flexibility and political force of  labelling social, cultural or 
political practices as ‘European’ or ‘Balkan’. It is the central aim of this paper to move 
beyond the identification of scripts of similarity and difference and to focus on their 
political effects.  I have argued that ideas of Europe circulating in contemporary Bosnia 
do not challenge the primacy of the state, despite the prevalence of references to forms of 
solidarity beyond the nation state. Rather, the virtue of European association has been 
deployed to legitimise the strengthening of competing visions of statehood in Bosnia. 
‘Europe’, then, does not act as a marker of virtue, a sign of the benevolent intentions of 
international agencies or a radical break from the nationalist past of parties such as the 
SDS. Rather it is a discourse of occlusion, a term that serves to mask the political practice 
structured around struggles over state power.  
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